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No evidence exists that the defendants who press these appeals do so
with the knowledge that their claim is frivolous.'
There is no good reason why, in these circumstances, indigent persons
should not choose to litigate2indefinitely and some have shown themselves prone to do just that.
I intend to appeal, of course. What else have I got to do for the rest
of my life?3
I.

INTRODUCTION-THE

MINIMUM STANDARDS

PROJECT

In 1964, -the American Bar Association established a fifteen-member Special Committee on Minimum Standards for the Administration
of Criminal Justice. The work of drafting the Standards was delegated
to Advisory Committees which covered seven functional areas.' Each
of the Advisory Committees has prepared or is preparing reports on
several topics within its functional area.
In March, 1969, the Advisory Committee on Sentencing and Review released the Tentative Draft of Standards Relating to Criminal
Appeals. It might be expected that such a document would place primary emphasis on a search for creative ideas that would be effective
to reverse the tide of groundless criminal matters that threatens to
inundate the appellate courts.' This comment undertakes a critical
* Member of the Editorial Board, University of Miami Law Review.
1. ABA, SPECIAL COMM. ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO CRIMINAL APPEALS 2. (Tentative Draft, March, 1969).
(Hereinafter cited as APPEAL STANDARDS).

2. G. Hazard, Jr., After the Trial Court-The Realities of Appellate Review, in THE
(H. Jones ed. 1965).
3. Miami Herald, May 28, 1969, § A, at 14, col. 4 (Gary Steven Krist commenting on
his life sentence in the "coffin kidnapping" of Barbara Jane Mackle).
4. Police Function, Pretrial Proceedings, Prosecution and Defense Functions, Criminal
Trial, Sentencing and Review, Fair Trial and Free Press, and Judge's Function.
5. Statistical data on the magnitude of this problem may be found in the Annual
Reports of the Director of the Administrative Office of United States Courts. See also
Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of
Review and the National Law, 82 HARv. L. REv. 542 (1969).
COURTS, THE PUBLIC, AND THE LAW EXPLOSION
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examination of the proposed Standards against that expectation, and
discusses some alternatives not reported by the Committee. Portions
of the proposed Standards that have no substantial direct effect on the
frivolous appeal problem (e.g., appeals by the prosecution) are not
considered here.
Though the draft makes it clear' that it represents only the views
of the Advisory Committee at this stage, the influence of the version
finally adopted may be far-reaching: the Chairman of the Special Committee on Minimum Standards was Warren E. Burger, now Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States.
II.

SCOPE AND FUNCTION OF THE APPELLATE PROCESS-THE

"REMARKABLE

DOCTRINE"

The first questions considered by the Standards are the basic ones
of what the role of appellate review should be, and what decisions should
be reviewable. "The possibility of appellate review," state the Standards,
"should exist for every criminal conviction," but "[a]n appeal is not
a necessary and integral part of every conviction." 7 The Committee
considered, but rejected, the possibility that appeal in every case should
be automatic. It was noted that the elimination of obstacles to appellate
review by indigents,8 and the rising rate of appeals resulting therefrom,
is lessening the effective distinction between automatic and elective
appeals.?
Does the Standard mean that every convicted defendant should
have the right to an appeal? From its wording, one could conclude that
a discretionary appeal would provide the "possibility of appellate review," but elsewhere the Standards provide that "the decision whether
to appeal . . . must be the defendant's own choice," 1 and that require-

ments for preliminary screening by the trial court or leave to appeal
from the appeal court serve no useful purpose." Thus it appears that
2
it should be within the defendant's sole discretion to institute an appeal.'
The commentary notes that appellate review in its present form is a,
rather recent development in our law, and that the Supreme Court has
often assumed, but never decided, that such review is not a federal
6. APPEAL STANDARDS at iv.

7. Id. at 15.
8. See, e.g., Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963) (trial transcript); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (counsel) ; Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) (filing fees)
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)

(trial transcript).

9. In the District of Columbia, the rate of appeals from convictions has risen from
18.3% in 1950 to 92.6% in 1966. APPEAL STANDARDS at 20.
10. APPEAL STANDARDS at 47.

11. Id. at 60.
12. The Standards adopt the usual rule that appeals may be taken only from final
judgments, and recommend that appeals from pleas of guilty or nolo contendere be allowed.
APPEAL STANDARDS at 28. Cf. Ramey v. State, 199 So.2d 104 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967), noted in
22 U. MIAmi L. REV. 187 (1967).
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constitutional requirement;' 8 but it is asserted that "there is no disagreement today on the wisdom of providing a system of appeals in
criminal cases."' 4 That such a system should exist would hardly be
doubted, but there is not such unanimity on the question whether its
scope should be as broad as it is today, or as the Committee suggests
it should be. A layman who has examined the subject with some care
has spoken of the right of appeal existing in most jurisdictions today
as "the remarkable doctrine that every . . . convicted defendant is en15
titled 'as of right' to an appeal of the judgment against him.7
Why have most jurisdictions, and the Committee, adopted this
"remarkable doctrine"? Is it, in fact, remarkable? The two reasons
commonly advanced for having appellate reviews are: (1) to see that
justice is done to the appellant, and (2) to develop uniform and consistent legal standards for the jurisdiction. The first of these would seem
to demand that review be available to any defendant who feels he has
not been dealt with fairly, while the second would require review only
of cases that present some novel legal question. Thus, in advocating the
universal availability of review, the Committee seems to place emphasis
on the courts' role of correcting misdeeds of human, hence fallible, trial
judges. If that role for an appeal court is to be assigned any importance
at all, then the Committee's position, i.e., making the court available
of right to all defendants, seems to follow logically. Implicit in the report is a rejection of the notion that certain convictions should be regarded as so trivial as to be governed by the principle de minimis.
The stance taken by the Standards leaves the door to the appeal
court wide open for the most trivial of causes, for now the court must
dispose of every case where the appellant feels he has been treated unfairly. Thus, the opinion of an emotionally involved, usually uneducated
layman on the legal question of whether the appeal has merit can set
the appellate process in motion. But attempts to control these by interposing threshold determinations of merit, frivolity, probable cause,
and the like seem to collide with the right itself-if the defendant's
right is to an appellate determination of his case, then the determination
should not be made by other than the appeal court.' 6 And if the determination is made by the appeal court, efficiency and due process cannot
both be served by a preliminary determination which either disposes of
the case without a full hearing, or sets it down for a full hearing, to consume the court's time another day.
13. See, e.g., Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S.
252, 257 (1959); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956) (concurring opinion).
14. APPEAL STANDARDS at 16.
15. M. Mayer, THE LAWYERS 477 (1966).
16. Such determinations by the trial court have been uniformly held to be reviewable.
See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962); Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674
(1958); Farley v. United States, 354 U.S. 521 (1957); Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S.
565 (1957) ; Fitzsimmons v. Yeager, 391 F.2d 849 (3d Cir. 1968). Thus, they may aggravate
rather than alleviate the workload of the appellate court.
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Furthermore, though the right to an appeal is only contemplated to
extend to appellants who believe they have not been treated fairly, any
inquiry into the appellant's "good faith"'-that is, whether he in fact
possesses the required state of mind-must be another exercise in futility. 8 Whether the defendant believes he has meritorious grounds or not,
the chances are good that he has not-yet there is the slight possibility
that a contention the appellant privately believes to be entirely frivolous
may be found to be grounds for a reversal. In short, the appellant's good
faith is, or should be, irrelevant.
Thus the Standards proceed from the premise that relief from the
burdens of frivolous appeals cannot be obtained by imposing new limitations on the defendant's basic right, because to do so would be either
inconsistent with the primary function of correcting error in the courts
below, or impractical, or both. This writer agrees with the Committee as
to the basic function of courts of appeal in criminal cases, and concludes
(with some regret) that a logical consequence of that premise is that the
appellant should indeed be invested with the power to set the appellate
machinery in motion for any (or no) reason. This is not to be taken to
mean that appellants are somehow entitled to abuse the appellate process,
but rather that economy and due process forbid inquiries into whether it
is being so abused. Instead, emphasis should be placed on the development of procedures and techniques that will give each case only so much
of the court's attention as its merits warrant, with a resulting disposition
calculated to be conclusive of the matter. A secondary goal of such
methods should be to deny to appellants such unintended fringe benefits
as delay, time away from prison to attend court proceedings, and the egoinflation of reported decisions.
III.

TRANSITION FROM TRIAL COURT TO APPELLATE COURT-THE
INTERIM PERIOD

The Committee next directs its attention to the period of time between judgment by the trial court and invocation of the court of appeals'
jurisdiction. This period, the Committee recognizes, has been a source of
great difficulty in appellate proceedings under present law because of the
tendency on the part of both trial court and trial counsel to regard the
matter as being at an end with the imposition of sentence.
A. The Notice of Appeal-Opportunity Overlooked?
The Standard proposed here is that "a definite time period . . .
should be specified as the time during which appeals must be instituted.
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)

and FED. R. App. PRo. 24 deny leave to appeal in

forma

pauperis when the trial court certifies that the appeal is not taken in good faith.
18. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962), provides a good example of the
confusion courts have generated on this question:

We hold, instead, that "good faith" in this context must be measured by an
objective standard. We consider a defendant's good faith in this type of case demonstrated when he seeks appellate review of any issue not frivolous. Id. at 445.
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The appellate court, however, should have power to entertain appeals
taken after the prescribed time if the delay is found to be excusable."' 9
The Standard goes on to suggest that it is "appropriate" for the trial
court to assume the burden of informing the defendant of his right to
an appeal with counsel, and of the time limitation.2 °
Apparently, this proposal means that the existing procedure for
instituting appeals is adequate with a single change-filing of the notice
within the required time is no longer to be thought of as "jurisdictional."21 This in fact very closely approximates the present state of the
law in federal courts under decisions which "dispense with literal compliance in cases where it cannot fairly be exacted."22 Some of these cases
have managed to do this without violence to the jurisdictional idea, by
finding that the defendant did some act within the period which the court
finds to be sufficient notice.23 In other cases, resort has been had to the
device of vacating the judgment and sentence and remanding for a new
sentence from which a timely appeal may be taken.24 In the Fifth Circuit,
the formula is to have the case
remanded to:the trial court, there to be reinstated on the docket
as of the date to be fixed by the trial court from which the time
for appeal shall commence to run.25
Such decisions seem to put to rest any remaining vitality that the "jurisdictional" notion may have had. The state of the law-in federal courts
at least-clearly is that out-of-time appeals are being allowed in the
discretion of appeal courts, on grounds difficult or impossible to reconcile
with the "jurisdictional" idea. The Standard here thus seems to propose
nothing more than "telling it like it is." The additional suggestion that
the trial court could "appropriately" inform the defendant of his rights
relative to an appeal adds nothing new. This is a requirement in federal
courts2 6 and in those of Florida;27 it is clearly "appropriate" anywhere.
But is "telling it like it is" enough in this vital area? It is this
writer's opinion that a fresh look at the means now employed to institute
appeals could yield new procedures that would substantially ease the
burden of both trial and appellate courts.
First, is a "notice of appeal," filed on the initiative of the defendant
and/or his counsel, the best way to invoke the appellate jurisdiction? It
is suggested that it is not. The notice presumably appears in the right
19. APPEAL STANDARDS at 41.

20. Id. at 40.
21. United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 224 (1960).
22. Advisory Committee's Note to FEo. R. APP. PRO. 3, 43 F.R.D. 61, 126 (1968).
23. See Fullen v. United States, 378 U.S. 139 (1964) ; Richey v. Wilkins, 335 F.2d 1 (2d
Cir. 1964).
24. Rodriquez v. United States, - U.S. -, 89 S. Ct. 1715 (1969); United States ex
rel. Thurmond v. Mancusi, 275 F. Supp. 508 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
25. Atilus v. United States, 406 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1969).
26. FED. R. CR. PRO. 32(a)(2).
27. FLA. R. CR. PRO. 1.670.
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place at the right time if the defendant elects to appeal. But nothing
appears otherwise. Can this "nothing" foreclose the defendant finally? Or
did he perhaps not know of his right to an appeal? Or did he think his
counsel was handling it for him? Uncertainty in -this area is one of the
prime reasons that criminal matters can be kept ping-ponging from one
court to another, year after year.28 This question of defendant's desire
for an appeal could be foreclosed by replacing the present notice of
appeal with a mandatory election, to be made a part of the trial court's
29
findings of fact in every case.

Other possibilities exist at this stage for procedural changes which
would preclude attempts at factual determinations years after the original
conviction. A small number of questions relating to events after conviction
have provided grist for countless remands for evidentiary hearings. 0 These
questions relate to the defendant's knowledge of his rights to appeal and
to counsel on appeal, 8' the court's knowledge of the defendant's desire for
an appeal, and the presence, absence, or waiver of counsel, or of "effective" counsel. Might it not be possible, by replacing the notice of appeal
with a more informative document, to foreclose most of these questions?
For such a procedure to be effective, it would be necessary for the trial
court to retain not only jurisdiction, but active supervision of the case
until the election whether to appeal has been made, and that the trial
court's record continue through this period and contain express findings
as to the advice to the defendant as to his rights on appeal, his desire for
an appeal, and his status with respect to counsel. There would normally
seem to be no reason to question or redetermine such factual findings in
later proceedings. Of course, such a procedure would also help to assure
that the defendant's rights receive the meticulous protection to which
they are entitled.
28. Baker v. Wainwright, 391 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1968), has a typical history. After
Baker's conviction in January, 1965, his counsel (the public defender) concluded there was
no basis for an appeal and did not take one. Baker's pro se appeal failed. Damron v. State,
182 So.2d 313 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966). Baker then tried to obtain post-conviction relief under
FLA. R. CR. PRO. 1.850, and the trial court denied relief. On appeal, this denial was affirmed.
Baker v. State, 191 So.2d 284 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966). Baker then instituted a habeas corpus
proceeding in the Supreme Court of Florida without success. Baker v. Wainwright, 197 So.2d
291 (Fla. 1967). He next tried a habeas corpus proceeding in the Federal District Court.
This was denied without a hearing and Baker appealed. The Fifth Circuit remanded the
case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on whether Baker's indigency and
desire to appeal were made known to the trial court, and if so, whether he knowingly
waived his right to appointment of appellate counsel. Baker v. Wainwright, 391 F.2d 248
(5th Cir. 1968). This case has been the subject of at least eight separate proceedings thus
far. There is no reason to believe it is at an end.
29. A somewhat similar procedure is suggested in Coleman v. State, 215 So.2d 96, 103
(Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
30. See, e.g., Baker v. Wainwright, 391 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1968); Loper v. Beto, 383
F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1967); Edge v. Wainwright, 347 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1965); Pate v.
Holman, 341 F.2d 764 (5th Cir. 1965); State ex rel. Miller v. Wainwright, 213 So.2d 290
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
31. Presumably, these two questions will be eliminated in Florida and federal courts by
the rules requiring the court to inform the defendant.
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If a procedure such as this were used, there might be less occasion to
consider the question of out-of-time appeals.8 2 The procedure should be
so arranged that the invocation of appellate jurisdiction would come, if at
all, when the trial court made the additional factual findings discussed
above. Otherwise, there would still be a period of limbo during which
such questions might again arise. Since this would be done on the initiative of the court, the question of delay by the appellant and whether or
not it was excusable would not arise. If the election by the defendant is
not to appeal and the other factual determinations are duly made, the
most popular questions on which to base a collateral attack-what did
or did not happen during 'this interim period-would be unavailable to
the defendant.
B. Counsel 'During the Interim Period
Standard 2.211 concludes that, in the normal course of things, it
would be preferable for trial counsel to stay with the case, counsel the defendant on the probable grounds for an appeal, and prosecute the appeal
if the defendant so elects, rather than routinely to appoint new counsel
for an appeal. It is pointed out that the more general practice at present
is 'to appoint new counsel for the appeal, either for geographical reasons,
or because the new counsel is better versed in appellate procedure, or for
no obvious reason.
The Committee cites no cases in favor of, and four cases against,
its recommendation that the decision whether or not to appeal should
ultimately rest with the defendant rather than his counsel. 4 But, as
is discussed infra, there is no reason that the Minimum Standards
task should be likened to a restatement. The Standards should be responsive to the problems of today which are not adequately dealt with by the
law as it exists. The cases cited are to the effect that the attorney has an
ethical duty not to institute an appeal which he believes is without
merit.85 But of course, if the decision is ultimately out of the attorney's
hands, no breach of duty can be attributed to him. The Standards analogize the situation to the defendant's personal decision whether or not to
plead guilty. It might also be said that in the case of appointed counsel,
where the defendant usually takes no part in the selection, logic does not
demand that the defendant be bound by the decisions of his counsel to
the same extent that might be required in the case of retained counsel.
Of course, it could be said that this lowers the last barrier to an appeal
32. The "exhaustion of remedies" doctrine does not bar habeas corpus relief to a
prisoner who has failed to take a timely appeal. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
33. APPEAL STANDARDS at 47.
34. Buxton v. Brown, 222 Ga. 56, 150 S.E.2d 636 (1966); Richardson v. Wiliard, 341
Ore. 376, 406 P.2d 156 (1965) ; In re Graham's Petition, 106 N.H. 545, 215 A.2d 697 (1965);
People v. Buck, 6 App. Div. 2d 528, 179 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (3d Dep't 1958).
35. Florida cases to this effect: Coleman v. State, 215 So.2d 96 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968);
Mobley v. State, 215 So.2d 90 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968) ; Smith v, State, 192 So,2d 346 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1966).
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that the defendant knows to be completely lacking in merit, but how
effective is the barrier? If his counsel refuses to take an appeal, there
are several possibilities. The defendant might abide by his counsel's
advice and never be heard from again; but more likely, he will institute
the appeal himself. Having done so, it is clear under present law that he
is now entitled to have new counsel appointed."6 If he proceeds with the
appeal on his own, he might later urge in collateral proceedings that he
was denied counsel. 7 If he does not institute the appeal himself, he might
allege in later proceedings that he was denied his right to an appeal. It
seems clearly preferable to this writer to follow the approach adopted by
the Standards and let the appeal be instituted by nothing more than the
defendant's expression of a desire to do so. But if the defendant's entrance into the appeal court is to be made so easy, it seems essential that
cases lacking in merit be given a speedy exit. The Committee's recommendations on this subject, discussed infra,88 do not seem to meet this
requirement.
If additional confusion is needed as to the present state of the law
in this area, it is provided in federal courts by rule 32(a)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Rule directs that the clerk of
the court file notice of appeal for the defendant if he so requests. Thus,
after counsel tells the defendant that his ethical obligations forbid him to
take an appeal if he believes it to be without merit, the defendant can
have the appeal instituted with a nod of his head to the clerk. While there
are no cases to support the proposition that defense counsel is under a
duty to institute an appeal he considers without merit, it is well settled
that the appellant is entitled to counsel once the appeal is instituted, "
and that counsel must play the role of advocate rather than amicus
curiae.40 There is also no doubt that counsel has the duty to advise the
defendant on the possibilities for an appeal after he is convicted.4 It
would seem anomalous to say that counsel has a duty not to institute the
appeal when his failure to do so, rather than preventing a useless proceeding, may open the way to later collateral proceedings based on denial
of counsel. It seems better to say that by instituting the appeal, counsel
is merely fulfilling a procedural requirement, and this should not be taken
as an expression by him on the merits of the appeal. If counsel at the trial
is not required to entertain a good faith belief in the defendant's innocence,42 it seems doubtful that his belief that the trial proceedings
were or were not free from error should be any more determinative of
36. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
37. See, e.g., Worts v. Dutton, 395 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1968).
38. Section IV infra.
39. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
40. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 258 (1967).
41. Cedillo v. Beto, 399 F.2d 667 (5th Cir. 1968); Merkel v. Beto, 387 F.2d 667 (5th
Cir. 1968); Wainwright v. Simpson, 360 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1966). Cf. Norvell v. Illinois,
373 U.S. 420, 424 (1963).
42. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, No. 11. Cf. Id. No. 15.

COMMENTS
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his conduct relative to the appeal. The reason for the rule in the trial
court is, of course, that the defendant is entitled to have his case determined in a regular court proceeding with the aid of counsel, even if the
facts are so damning that no lawyer could reasonably believe him innocent. While the reason for applying that reasoning to appellate proceedings entered into at the defendant's election may not be as strong, it
is the opinion of this writer that the availability of counsel for an appeal
should be coextensive with the availability of the appellate process;
when the appellant no longer deserves the services of counsel, he deserves
to be out of court. This is generally the position taken by the Standards.
It may be justified on the additional practical ground that the irregularity
and confusion caused by appellants representing themselves impairs the
efficiency of the courts.4
In its consideration of the question of counsel for the appeal, the
Committee seems to consider only two alternatives: continuation of the
services of trial counsel, or the routine appointment of new counsel by the
appeal court. The latter is said to have developed as the more usual procedure.44 The Committee concludes that continuing the services of trial
counsel on appeal would be preferable in most cases.48 It is submitted
that a third possibility which might serve to foreclose later questions
about the adequacy of counsel was overlooked.
As one court has observed,
[C]onvicted felons almost unanimously relish the prospect of
putting to public judicial test the competence of their erstwhile
defenders ....

[E]ven trial counsel, having lost, can almost in-

variably enumerate what in the hindsight of disaster appear to
have been errors.46
The feeling on the part of the defendant that trial counsel has "done
him in" is seldom justified and is even less frequently grounds for relief,
because the usual standard for inadequacy of counsel as a ground for
reversal is a stringent one. Counsel's conduct of the case must be such as
to reduce the trial to a sham or a mockery. 4 But the standard of competence and diligence required of counsel during the interim period after
conviction is not so clearly established, and has provided issues for many
post-conviction proceedings and appeals therefrom.4 8 It is suggested that
43. See, e.g., Gossett v. State, 191 So.2d 281 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
44. APPEAL STANDARDS at 50.
45. Id. at 49.
46. Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787, (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850
(1958).
47. Id. See also Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1965).
48. Atilus v. United States, 406 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1969); Landry v. United States,
401 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1968); Beto v. Martin, 396 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1968); Worts v.
Dutton, 395 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1968); Loper v. Beto, 383 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1967);
Pierson v. State, 214 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968) ; State ex rel Miller v. Wainwright, 213
So.2d 290 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
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many such issues, meritorious and otherwise, could be averted by allowing the appellant the option of retaining trial counsel, or discharging him
and having new counsel appointed by the trial court as a matter of course
at any time during the post-conviction, pre-appeal period. This would be
no more complex or expensive than routine appointment of new counsel
by the appellate court. It should virtually eliminate appointments of new
counsel by the appeal court once the case is there. It would give the
defendant the opportunity to be told by a second lawyer that his appeal
is without merit, if that is the case. And since the replacement would be
granted as a matter of course, the defendant would be denied the opportunity of "putting to public judicial test the competence of his erstwhile
defender," except to the extent that his substitute counsel undertakes to
press the issue on direct appeal. If the defendant does not elect to have
trial counsel replaced, he should be burdened with a very strong presumption that he was satisfied with the way the defense was conducted. Thus
a step could be taken which would bring the indigent a large step nearer
to equality with the rich man, which would not add appreciably to the
cost or complexity of appellate review, and which would close the door
on prisoners whose only purpose in raising such questions is "a chance to
get out of prison for a week or two at the state's expense."49
C. Frivolous Appeals-Pre-Appeal Screening
The Standards reject the use of threshold determinations to eliminate
frivolous appeals as unnecessary complications which create more problems than they solve. If such determinations are made by the trial court,
then consistency with an appeal "as of right" demands that the determinations themselves be appealable." ° If made by the appeal court, an
unnecessary step is added to the process.
The commentary contains a good review of such screening devices
and their rather dismal record in practice. To this is added a theme which
recurs throughout the document-that if counsel would only take the
trouble to inform the defendant in detail why his appeal cannot succeed,
the defendant, being a good fellow, will decide not to appeal. After taking
Mr. Justice Clark to task 5 for stating "We all know that the overwhelming percentage of in forma pauperis appeals are frivolous," 52 the Committee arrives at the conclusion that "it is not evident that any significant
number [of defendants] act contrary to counsel's evaluation of the
case. '5 8 Certainly all would agree that counsel should undertake to dissuade his client from an appeal he considers hopeless, and perhaps many
49. Cerf, The Federal Habeas Corpus Act and the Recent Amendments Limiting Its
Use and Abuse by State Prisoners,22 U. or MImses L. Rav. 409, 419 (1967).
50. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 458 (1962) (concurring opinion).
51. APPEAL STANDARDS at 61 n.1l.
52. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
53. APPEAL STANDARDS at 63.
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fail to do so or do so inadequately. But to offer this as any sort of solution to the existing problem of frivolous appeals seems to this writer
extremely naive.
The Standards also discuss, and reject, the possibility of imposing
some kind of penalty on an appellant if the appeal court finds his case to
have been exceptionally unmeritable.54 The impracticality of such a
measure is fairly obvious. Such a sanction could only be imposed fairly
on an appellant who takes an appeal with foreknowledge that his claim is
frivolous. But as was discussed previously,5 5 this difficult factual inquiry
should be viewed as irrelevant and not determinative of anything.
IV.

PROCESSING THE APPEAL-"GREATER WISDOM"?

A. Supervision During the Preparation of Cases
The Standards recommend that closer supervision of pending cases
be maintained by the court by assigning each case to a single judge who,
with the help of an administrative aide, is to "resolve the procedural
questions that arise." 56 This would permit disposition of a number of
questions on motion without a hearing by the full court. Such a procedure
would be clearly permissible under present federal rules, 7 but apparently
58
it would not be so under Florida rules.
The proposed Standard would surely speed up the processing of
appeals, but it would be of no assistance in allowing the court to dispose
summarily of appeals which lack any basis. This is for the reason that
the power of the single appointed judge would be limited to resolving
procedural questions. Consistent with this position, the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure provide that "a single judge may not dismiss or
otherwise determine an appeal."5 9
Why must the final determination be made by a multi-judge panel?
That idea seems to be deeply ingrained in most appellate processes; but
these processes developed in times when non-meritorious criminal appeals
did not impose a substantial burden on the courts. The Committee adopts
the view of an earlier American Bar Association report ° which "criticized as unsound any practice of one appellate judge reviewing the action
of one trial judge."6 1 The logic supporting this view seems to be that the
reason appeal courts are less fallible than trial courts (and one must
54. Id. at 70.
55. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
56. APPEAL STANDARDS at 72.
57. FED. R. App. PRO. 27(c).

58. FLA. APP. R. 2.2(a) (1): "Three judges shall constitute a panel for and shall consider each case . . . ." FLA. ApP. R. 3.9(d): "[T]he Court will hear (motions) ...." (Emphasis added.)
59. FED. R. App. PRO. 27(c).
60. A.B.A., SECTIoN OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, REPORT OF INTERNAL OPERATING
PROCEDURES OF APPELLATE COURTS (1961).

61. APPEAL STANDARDS at 24.
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assume that they are to justify their superior position in the hierarchy) is
that they "provide an opportunity for several minds to check the trial
decisions of one mind."62 In the opinion of this writer, one who accepts
that idea must be prepared to swallow also the analogous proposition that
a jury is less fallible than a judge. If appeal courts are less fallible than
trial courts, the essential reason must be that they are staffed by better
minds.
B. Omission of Oral Argument and Written Opinionthe Fifth Circuit Rules
Even if one accepts the Committee's premise that the decisions
of multiple judge panels provide "greater wisdom,"6 would it not be
wise to provide a ready means for disposing of causes which require no
wisdom at all? The proposal for placing each case in the hands of a single
judge appears to be a sound one, but real improvement in the handling
of frivolous appeals might be had if the judge's authority were expanded
to allow him to rule on motions to affirm by the prosecution. This means
of expeditiously determining frivolous appeals need not collide with any
constitutional requirement, nor would it operate in a discriminatory
fashion against indigents. An appellant has no more constitutional right
to be heard by a multi-judge panel than he has to be heard by the court
sitting en banc."4
One writer has suggested that a single judge might perform a preappeal screening process, rejecting on his own initiative cases that are
without merit.65 It would seem, however, that such a procedure as that
might go too far, too fast. It would take less effort on the part of the
Court to let the prosecution assume its normal adversary role, by accompanying its initial brief with a motion to affirm if it thought that the case
is entirely without merit. Until this occurs, the assigned judge would
take no action, giving the case the benefit of a presumption that it has
some merit. The prosecution should be made to understand that such a
motion will succeed only if it clearly appears that the appellant is not entitled to any relief. That is to say, the prosecution should be discouraged
from making such motions a matter of routine, which would amount to
an additional step in each and every case.
If the motion to affirm is successful it would have the force of a final
disposition on the merits, not reviewable by a multiple-judge panel of the
court. Otherwise, the motion procedure would be no more than another
intermediate step. The only resort should be to whatever higher appellate
body is available. That, of course, would be a discretionary review in most
jurisdictions.
If the appellant's case survives the motion to affirm, or if no motion
62. Operating Procedures of Appellate Courts, supra note 59, at 14.
63. APPEAL STANDARDS at 24.
64. Cf. FED. R. APP. PRo. 35: "Such a hearing is not favored and ordinarily will not
be ordered . .. ."
65. P. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the
Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARv. L. REV. 542, 575 (1969).

1969]

COMMENTS

is made, the case would be set down for decision by a three-judge panel.
It should be anticipated that a significant percentage of cases reaching
this stage would nevertheless not be of such a nature as to present to the
court any really difficult question. It should be within the power of the
court to deny oral argument, and the court should decide the case without
opinion or with the briefest of memorandum opinions unless the case has
some aspect that cannot be determined by obvious analogy to one or two
precedents.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
recently promulgated local rules that appear to be a step in this direction.66 Fifth Circuit rule 17 provides for appointment of "panels to
review pending cases for appropriate assignment or disposition ...
Rules 18, 19, and 20 . .. "

under

Rule 18 permits transfer of cases in the court's discretion to a "summary calendar" for decision without oral argument. Provision is made
for notice to parties that their case has been so docketed, but it does not
appear that a party is guaranteed an opportunity to contest this decision.
Rule 19 provides for dismissal 7 or affirmance" on motion by the appellee.
These motions, which are normally to be filed within fifteen days after
the appeal is docketed, are generally not argued orally in the Fifth Circuit.69 Under rule 20 the court may, "as a result of a review under Rule
17," find an appeal to be frivolous and without merit and dismiss it
without notice.
These new rules appear to give the Fifth Circuit some additional
flexibility in giving trivial cases no more attention than they deserve.
However, there is some question whether rule 18 conflicts with the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. ° Rule 34 of the federal rules provides
for thirty minutes oral argument per side "[u]nless otherwise provided
for by rule," and allows the court to terminate oral argument "whenever
in its judgment further argument is unnecessary."'" But the Advisory
Committee's note to the rule states that the "spirit of the rule [is] that
a reasonable time should be allowed."72 On the other hand, the Supreme
Court has said that "[o]ral argument on appeal is not an essential element of due process."7 The reasoning of the Fifth Circuit, in invoking
this rule without challenge,74 does not appear to conflict with the federal
rule:
66. 5TH Cm. R. 17, 18, 19, 20 (Adopted Dec. 1968).
67. On the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction. 5TrH Cm. R. 19(a).
68. On any other ground. Id.
69. 5TH Cia. R. 10.
70. FED. R. Ap. PRO. 47 gives courts the power to make local rules not inconsistent
with the Federal Rules.
71. FED. R. App. PRo. 34(b).
72. Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Report oj Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 43 F.R.D. 61, 152 (1968).
73. Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 286 (1948); see also Federal Communications
Commission v. WJR, The Goodwill Station, 337 U.S. 265, 276 (1949); Magnesium Casting
Co. v. Hoban, 401 F.2d 516 (Ist Cir. 1968).
74. Wittner v. United States, 406 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1969); Groendyke Transport v.
Davis, 406 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1969).
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When a case is frivolous or its outcome so certain as a practical
matter the appellate court is not compelled to sacrifice either
the rights of other waiting suitors, its own irreplaceable judgetime, or administrative efficiency in judicial output by a traditional submission with all the trappings.7"
The federal rule allows the court "to terminate the argument whenever
in its judgment further argument is unnecessary." 6 If in its judgment
no argument at all is necessary, why should "the spirit of the rule"
dictate the allowance of "a reasonable time?"17 7 In the opinion of this
writer, denial of oral argument is a powerful weapon which properly
belongs in the court's arsenal of defenses against those who would trespass on its time.
The Standards consider omission of oral argument only in terms of
waiver by appellant's counsel to avoid oral argument of contentions that
are weak or hopeless. "In that case it is said that counsel should not
have to stand up in court and attempt to make an oral argument that
conceals the deficiencies in the case. ' 78 But where such an elected course
might make it appear that the action of the appellant's counsel was
adverse to his client, and might communicate to the court that counsel
was aware of the weakness of his client's position, the denial of oral argument by the court could only mean that the court did not believe the need
for further information in order to reach its decision.
Another method discussed in the Standards that might speed the disposition of cases is the more extensive use of short opinions or per curiam
orders. Appellate courts should certainly make long opinions the exception rather than the rule. In this regard, it might be worth noting that a
decision which was not reported at all would take some of the fun out of
appealing, by denying the appellant the pleasure of seeing his name in
the reporter, pitted fearlessly against the "director of prisons," the
"state," or even the whole United States.
It might be wise for appellate judges to check their past opinions in
Shepard's Citations periodically to see if others think they have added
anything to the law. If a case is not cited by someone else within a reasonable period of time, the judge should ask himself whether writing
the opinion was a justifiable expenditure of his time.
C. Counsel on Appeal
The position taken by the Standards is that the defendant should
have the "assistance of counsel at all stages of appeal. ' 79 If counsel is
75. Groendyke Transport v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969).
76. FED. R. APP. PRo. 34.
77. FLA. APP. R. 3.10(e) gives the court broad discretion to "require, or dispense with,
oral argument," and Fla. App. R. 3.9(e) denies oral argument on a motion to quash an
appeal as frivolous unless the court specifically orders it.
78. APPEAL STANDARDS at 82.

79.

APPEAL STANDARDS

at 73.
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convinced that the appeal lacks merit, but cannot persuade the client to
abandon it, he is to stay with the case and should not seek to withdraw.
He may, however, suggest that the case be submitted on briefs without
oral argument.
The proposed standard seems to be a sound one. As long as an appeal is before the appellate body, neither the interest of the court nor that
of the defendant is advanced by withdrawal of counsel. Florida courts
have frequently complained of the difficulty attending such cases when
the appellant continues pro se. 8°
It seems clear that the question to be determined should be whether,
at a given stage, the case could be resolved without further inquiry, not
whether counsel should abandon -the cause and allow the appellant and the
court to cope with it as best they can.
The Standard certainly seems preferable to the procedure laid down
by the Supreme Court in Anders v. California.8 In Anders, after counsel
filed notice of appeal, he notified the court that he would file no brief because he felt that the case lacked merit. Counsel was thereupon allowed to
withdraw. Appellant proceeded pro se after the court refused to appoint
new counsel. The Supreme Court found that this procedure denied the
appellant the assistance of "counsel acting in the role of advocate" 82 and
that counsel had acted "merely as amicus curiae." 8 To that extent the
Anders decision was clearly defensible, but the Court then went on to
volunteer a set of ground rules for allowances of withdrawal by counsel
from an appeal he considers frivolous. The rules require counsel to accompany his request for withdrawal with a brief setting forth, as favorably to appellant as possible, the points on appeal that are arguable. The
appellant is to receive a copy of this brief and be allowed time in which
to raise any points he chooses. But, as was noted by Mr. Justice Stewart:
[I]f the record did present any such arguable issues, the appeal
would not be frivolous and counsel would not have filed a nomerit letter in the first place.84
The conclusion seems inescapable that if counsel is allowed to withdraw
under the Anders formula, it follows that the case should be dismissed
or otherwise disposed of summarily. This is the usual result.85 But if that
is so, regardless of the attorney's ability to concoct a brief that advocates
80. See, e.g., Bashlor v. Wainwright, 189 So.2d 800 (Fla. 1966); Smith v. State, 192 So.2d
346 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966) ; Gossett v. State, 191 So.2d 281 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966). Cf. Garcia,
Defense Pro Se, 23 U. MiMxi L. REv. 551 (1969).
81. 386 U.S. 258 (1967).
82. Id. at 743.
83. Id. at 743.
84. Id. at 746.
85. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia employs
a printed "[s]tatement to be handed by the clerk to appointed counsel" which outlines the
Anders procedure for requesting withdrawal and adds that the appellant should be informed
that, if the withdrawal is granted, the appeal will ordinarily be dismissed.
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his client's position while he tells the court by his withdrawal request that
the position is indefensible, counsel's request for withdrawal amounts in
practical effect to a motion for dismissal or affirmance. 86 The proposed
Standard would not permit counsel to take such an action, and thus leaves
the initiative for such summary disposition where it belongs-on the appellee or on the court itself.
The Standard also avoids the difficulty inherent in the Anders requirement that the indigent be permitted to raise any points he chooses
after counsel has filed his Anders brief. That procedure would have counsel and client assuming adverse positions which would strain their relationship to an extent from which it could hardly be expected to recover
if the permission to withdraw should be denied. As the Standard concludes, it is better for the attorney to present on appellant's behalf any
claims from which he is unable to dissuade his client. But the presentation
should be made in a manner which, in the judgment of counsel, will do
the most good (or the least harm) for the client's cause. In the case of a
contention that is wholly without merit, this obviously means that he
should present it succinctly in the brief, omitting oral argument unless
the courts asks for it.
The Standards recognize that the proposed approach conflicts with
ethical requirements that counsel refrain from presenting frivolous contentions. 7 Apparently it is felt that such requirements should be amended
to conform with the Standard. Instead of making it counsel's duty not to
present frivolous contentions to the court, counsel's duty as to every contention, frivolous or not, should be to present it to the court, supported
by everything that he can find in its favor. If there is nothing to support
it, counsel should present it in such a way that it can be evaluated by the
court without causing delay, inconvenience, or irritation which might do
harm to the client's cause.
On the question of dismissal of appointed counsel and appointment
of a substitute, the Standards state that such requests by appellants are
to be viewed with disfavor. Here the indigent's status necessarily deviates
from that of a person with unlimited funds. If money were no object, one
86. At least one court seems to have reduced this to a matter of routine. The following
cases were disposed of by the Florida Third District Court of Appeals within a sixty-day
period by a form per curiam opinion reciting that the public defender has filed a brief in
accordance with the requirements of Anders, that his motion to withdraw is granted, and
that the case is affirmed: Fields v. State, 215 So.2d 893 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968) ; Alexander v.
State, 215 So.2d 85 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968); Myers v. State, 214 So.2d 895 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1968); Sharretts v. State, 214 So.2d 774 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968); Arline v. State, 214 So.2d
514 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968) ; Jones v. State, 214 So.2d 510 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968); West v. State,
214 So.2d 379 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968); Haywood v. State, 214 So.2d 378 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968);
Byrd v. State, 214 So.2d 346 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968); Francis v. State, 214 So.2d 346 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1968).
87. A.B.A. CANONS OF PaOFESSIONAL ETHICS, No. 44. Cf. Mitchell v. United States, 259
F.2d 787 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Coleman v. State, 215 So.2d 96 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968); Mobley
v. State, 215 So.2d 90 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968); Nelson v. State, 208 So.2d 506 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1968) ; Smith v. State, 192 So.2d 346 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
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might select, become disenchanted with, and dismiss an endless line of
attorneys. But the amount of actual benefit to the appellant's case that
could accrue from such conduct would diminish rapidly to positive harm
after the first or second replacement. The commentary suggests that
where "the defendant has a creditable reason for seeking different counsel""8 this should be allowed. Under the procedure suggested herein, that
is, allowing defendant to elect at the close of the trial whether to keep or
replace trial counsel, there would be very few "creditable reasons" for
allowing further substitution.
V.

CONCLUSION'

The fundamental ideas from which the Standards proceed appear to
be sound: that a defendant should have the right to have alleged errors
in his trial reviewed by a higher court; that the nature of the right together with practical considerations make it inadvisable to interpose preliminary inquiries as to merit, probable cause, and the like between the
defendant and a final disposition by the appellate court; that the right
to counsel should be coextensive with the right to appeal. But the Committee seemed unwilling to endorse any change in the implementation of
these ideas that might give courts the needed power to dispose finally
of a trivial appeal with a trivial amount of effort.
In the opinion of this writer, the Committee should have taken upon
itself the duty to innovate, to propose new ways to stem this waste of
judicial manpower and taxpayers' money. The alternatives contended for
herein represent only examples of what is needed. It is hoped that the
Tentative Draft will be revised before final adoption to reflect a more
realistic appraisal of the magnitude of the frivolous appeal problem and a
more fundamental emphasis on workable proposals for its solution.
88.
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